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THE USE OF MAIL TO SEND BOMBS

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The Use of Mail to Send Bombs, Seri...
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E THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
POSTAL OPERATIONS AND SERVICES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

MARCH 22, 1994

Serial No. 103-38

Printed for the use of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service



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THE USE OF MAIL TO SEND BOMBS

TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON POSTAL OPERATIONS AND SERVICES,
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Members present: Representatives Collins, Bishop, and Gilman.

Miss COLLINS. The Postal Operations and Services Subcommittee hearing on mail bombs is now in session.

Good morning. I would like to thank all of you for joining us this morning. In 1993 there were at least 10 incidents involving mail bombs. In six of those incidents, serious bodily harm and extensive property destruction were the results. Fortunately, in the other four mail bomb incidents of 1993, the bombs were detected and disassembled before any harm could occur.

It is impossible to determine when a mentally unstable person will attempt to send a bomb through the U.S. mail system. However, it is important that we send a clear signal to individuals who may be contemplating this senseless act that it will not be tolerated, and the agencies responsible for guarding against these shameful acts are thoroughly prepared to detect, apprehend and severely punish this action.

The U.S. Postal Service processes billions of letters and parcels each year. However, human safety must never be compromised for the sake of volume. Therefore, the purpose of this hearing today is to reassure postal workers, postal customers and the general public that every attempt is being made to guard against the possibility of anyone being injured by a mail bomb.

I am extremely pleased that we have representatives of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms here with us today.

Recognizing the need to safeguard the confidentiality of the security measures within each organization represented here today, I am confident that today's hearing will still afford us the opportunity to determine the effectiveness of how these agencies are sharing existing information, including new or pending technology, that will continue to enhance the successful ability of the law enforcement community to protect postal workers, as well as the general public, in the detection and elimination of the insanely lethal practice of sending bombs through the U.S. mail.

Again, thank you for being here today, and I look forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Good morning. I would like to thank all of you for joining us this morning. In 1993, there were at least 10 incidents involving mail bombs. In six (6) of those incidents, serious bodily harm and extensive property destruction were the results. Fortunately, in the other four (4) mail bombs incidents of 1993, the bombs were detected and disassembled before any harm could occur.

It is impossible to determine when a mentally unstable person will attempt to send a bomb through the U.S. mail system. However, it is important that we send a clear signal to individuals who may be contemplating this senseless act, that it will not be tolerated and the agencies responsible for guarding against these shameful acts, are thoroughly prepared to detect, apprehend and severely punish this action.

The U.S. Postal Service processes billions of letters and parcels each year. However, human safety must never be compromised for the sake of volume. Therefore, the purpose of this hearing today is to assure postal workers, postal customers and the general public, that every attempt is being made to guard against the possibility of anyone being harmed by a mail bomb.

I am extremely pleased that we have representatives of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), here with us today.

Recognizing the need to safeguard the confidentiality of the security measures within each organization represented here today, I am confident that today's hearing will still afford us the opportunity to determine the effectiveness of how these agencies are sharing existing information—including new or pending technology—that will continue to enhance the successful ability of the law enforcement community, to protect postal workers as well as the general public, in the detection and elimination of the insanely lethal practice of sending bombs through the U.S. mail.

Again thank you for being here today. I look forward to your testimony.

PRESS RELEASE—FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 1994

CONGRESSWOMAN BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS TAKES THE LEAD IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
OF USING THE MAIL TO SEND BOMBS

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Congresswoman Barbara-Rose Collins, (D-MI) Chair, Postal Operations and Services Subcommittee (of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee), will hold a Congressional oversight hearing to examine the status of coordinating efforts for eliminating the possibility of sending bombs through the mail.

"Recognizing the fact that the U.S. Postal Service processes billions of letters and parcels each year, the safety of postal workers as well as postal customers, should never be compromised for the sake of volume," stated Congresswoman Collins.

"We must send a clear signal to anyone contemplating the use of the U.S. mail system as an avenue to physically harm targeted individuals, that if you act on that impulse, the chances are extremely great that you will be apprehended and severely punished," concluded Congresswoman Collins.

In addition to the Postal Inspection Service, the Subcommittee has requested testimony from the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation and ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms), relative to the status of their respective efforts in coordinating and sharing existing information—including new or pending technology—that will continue to enhance the successful ability of those agencies who are ultimately responsible for protecting the safety of postal workers, as well as the general public, in the detection and elimination of any potential for sending bombs through the mail, via the U.S. Postal Service.

The hearing is scheduled for Tuesday, March 22, 1994, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 311 of the Cannon House Office Building.

Miss COLLINS. Our first witness is Michael Hearst, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector, U.S. Postal Service. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL HEARST, DEPUTY CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR, U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE

Mr. HEARST. Thank you, and good morning, Madam Chairwoman. I would like to get into some detail this morning, because of the importance of this hearing, and also to be as forthcoming as I can about our efforts in preventing and detecting mail bombs.

As you mentioned, I'm the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector for Criminal Investigations of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and I appreciate very much the opportunity to share with you our efforts in combating the serious and destructive crime of mail bombing.

As you know, the Postal Inspection Service is the law enforcement and audit arm of the U.S. Postal Service. We investigate and seek to prevent criminal attacks against our employees and customers, our Nation's postal system, and postal property. Postal inspectors have statutory authority to serve Federal warrants and subpoenas and to make arrests for postal related offenses.

Our investigative responsibilities include such offenses as: Armed robberies, murder of or assault upon postal employees; burglaries; theft of mail; mailing of obscene matter, bombs, and drugs; and the use of the mails to swindle the public. The Postal Inspection Service is also the Office of the Inspector General for the Postal Service with authority to detect and prevent fraud, waste and abuse in postal operations and programs.

The Inspection Service is one of the oldest investigative agencies of the United States. For more than 200 years, we have investigated postal and postal related crimes. For more than 100 years, the postal inspectors have been enforcing Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1716, which covers mail bombs, the mailing of injurious articles.

Of the 171 billion pieces of mail delivered by the Postal Service in 1993, only 10 contained mail bombs. That is one in 17 billion! Of those 10 pieces, only 6 actually detonated. Over the past 10 years, an average of 15 bombs per year have been sent through the U.S. mail, and fewer than half of those have actually detonated.

While even one mail bomb is one too many, the likelihood of one of our customers receiving a mail bomb is extremely remote, and the possibility of injury from actual detonation is even less. Because specific motives, revenge, extortion, terrorism, love triangles, and business disputes, are usually associated with mail bombings, the chances of a postal customer being randomly targeted by a mail bomber are further substantially reduced. As rare an occurrence as they are, the prevention, detection, and investigation of mail bombs receive immediate and priority attention by the Postal Inspection Service.

The entire complement of 2,100 postal inspectors has received basic mail bomb investigations training during the 14-week basic training at our academy in Potomac, MD. In addition, approximately 20 percent of our workforce has had advanced training in mail bomb investigative techniques.

A National Bomb Investigations Training Course for Postal Inspectors is held annually in Virginia Beach, VA, and it is as close to the real thing as possible. Inspectors receive training in mail bomb crime scene and investigative techniques. Bomb experts from

within the Inspection Service and outside provide hands-on instruction during this training course.

The Inspection Service maintains five nationally recognized crime laboratories strategically located throughout the country, and can immediately respond to any mail bomb crime scene location. Each of our 30 divisions has at least one bomb specialist.

Bomb response specialists and teams are assigned specifically equipped vehicles containing portable X-ray machines and crime scene processing kits. Inspectors and mail bomb forensic experts from our crime laboratories are on call 24 hours a day.

We have found that our best defense against mail bombs, however, is to educate postal customers and employees. A typical mail bomb is designed and packaged to withstand postal handling and to function only after the device is delivered, when the recipient opens the mail or removes an item from the mail.

Common characteristics of mail bombs include: Restricted endorsements such as "Personal" or "Private." Addressee's name/title may be inaccurate. There may be excessive postage. There may be distorted handwriting, homemade labels or cut-and-paste lettering. Misspelling of common words occurs. No return address or fictitious return address is often on these packages. Sometimes cancellation or postmark may be different from the return address.

Protruding wires or tin foil are also warning signs, oil stains or discoloration. Letter bombs may often feel rigid or appear uneven or lopsided. Parcel bombs may have an irregular shape, soft spots, or bulges. Unprofessional wrapping or excessive tape or string to secure the parcel may also be evident, and endorsements such as "Fragile—Handle With Care" or "Rush—Do Not Delay" may appear. Also, pressure or resistance when opening or removing the contents is sometimes a sign.

Customers and employees are advised to notify us if these warning signs are present or if they suspect, for any reason, that the mail item may be a bomb. It's a source of constant amazement to me how many times people receive an actual mail bomb and comment to someone in the room that this could be a mail bomb, this is kind of suspicious, and then, for some reason, go ahead and open it. So they really need to take these warning signs to heart.

I have brought some pamphlets today that outline all of the warnings that I just read to you, and I've made them available on the back table.

Emphasis is placed on education and awareness in our prevention efforts. Postal inspectors offer mail bomb presentations to postal customers, members of the law enforcement community, and any official or organization believed to be a target of a mail bomb. Organizations or groups that may be at risk from a particular bomber receive immediate attention from Postal Inspection Service bomb experts.

In the wake of the Judge Vance mail bombing in Alabama in 1989 and three other bombings or attempts in Jacksonville, FL, Savannah, and Atlanta, GA, inspectors conducted mail bomb prevention seminars in Atlanta for members of the NAACP, Federal Judges, corporate executives, and members of local law enforcement agencies.

We also take precautions at postal facilities to identify suspect packages and to safeguard employees. Postal inspectors provide guidelines to postal employees through in-service talks and articles in employee publications that explain how to identify suspicious parcels. This training recently enabled a letter carrier in Dumfries, VA, to identify such a parcel in a collection box that she was emptying. The parcel actually turned out to be a bomb, and the letter carrier took appropriate action to notify inspectors, which prevented any possible harm to its intended victim.

Also in the area of education and awareness, the Postal Inspection Service has produced a two-part video on mail bomb prevention. This is an in depth treatment of the subject, produced specifically for officials, corporations, and organizations believed to be at risk of receiving an explosive device by mail.

In addition, bomb posters such as this one illustrating characteristics of suspect parcels are made available to post offices and mail processing facilities throughout the country. These posters are also distributed to corporate mail centers and security officers upon request.

Our prevention and investigative efforts include coordination and cooperation with other law enforcement agencies. For example, in a case currently under investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) had, in the past, made a bomb presentation to the Knox County Attorney General's Office in Knoxville, TN.

The Postal Inspection Service had previously made a bomb presentation to the U.S. Attorney's Office, a former member of which is currently an official of the Knox County Attorney General's Office. As a result of these presentations, a suspicious parcel was identified on March 1, 1994, and determined to contain a mail bomb.

An incident occurring in December 1993, which included a series of bombings in upstate New York, further demonstrates the commitment and cooperation of ATF and the FBI and the Postal Inspection Service, as well as the New York State Police and various county and city law enforcement agencies.

The case included the possibility of terrorism in a bombing case in which the U.S. mails were used. Tragically, five murders also occurred. In this case, five bombs were delivered to separate victims; only one was handled by the Postal Service.

In view of our common objective, all of the agencies agreed ATF would be the lead agency, with the other agencies contributing their respective expertise. As a result of this cooperative effort, the case was solved in a matter of hours. Those responsible for these bombings are currently in jail awaiting trial.

In another case, the diligent efforts of postal inspectors led to the arrest and conviction of conspirators in a mail bomb case in Alaska in 1991. The intended victim was a key witness in a murder trial. The bomb killed the witness's father and severely injured his mother.

In a 1993 Nevada case, a mail bomb critically injured a highway patrol officer in his home. An investigation by postal inspectors led to the arrest of two men suspected of mailing the bomb.

We also never give up on a bomb case. For example, recently, a defendant who was extradited from Israel for the 1980 Manhattan Beach, CA, mail bomb murder of a 32-year-old secretary was con-

victed following a jury trial in U.S. District Court and sentenced to life in prison.

Another defendant, charged with aiding and abetting in commissioning the mail bombing, was recently arrested by postal inspectors as a fugitive in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, and returned to the United States to stand trial. These individuals are tied to the Jewish Defense League and are suspects in a series of other politically motivated bombings.

The large volume of mail handled by the Postal Service, over 550 million pieces per day, and the large number of facilities, 39,400, make the guaranteed detection of a mail bomb unfeasible. Nevertheless, the Postal Inspection Service makes every effort to prevent and detect bombs in the mail.

Our ability to prevent all mail bombings is limited by a number of factors. First, the Postal Service carries less than half of all parcels moved within the United States. Our efforts, therefore, do not cover the majority of parcels delivered by private carriers, such as in the upstate New York bombings.

Second, constitutional restrictions, Federal criminal statutes, postal treaties and conventions, Federal court decisions, and Postal Service regulations embodying these authorities limit our ability to examine carefully all parcels deposited in the U.S. mails. Even without these restrictions, the logistics of moving 171 billion pieces of mail and the lack of technology to quickly detect bombs prevents the Postal Service from guaranteeing protection to our customers.

Third, screening of all parcels is logistically unfeasible with respect to the material and personnel required to accomplish that task. However, we continue to work with the Federal Aviation Administration in implementing security procedures to reduce the likelihood a mail bomb would be carried on a passenger aircraft. The details of these efforts are not available for public disclosure, for obvious reasons.

We do, however, act quickly to inspect specific packages in accordance with regulations contained in the Domestic Mail Manual.

High threat situations also give rise to the selected examination of mail. During high visibility special events, such as the Democratic and Republican conventions, the 1990 Goodwill games, and the 1984 Olympics, we assisted in the screening of large volumes of mail prior to delivery with the consent of the addressees.

Additionally, postal inspectors and our crime laboratory personnel maintain close liaison with international and domestic organizations for the exchange of mail bomb information and intelligence.

During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the possibility existed that a state-sponsored terrorist group might use the mails to attack passenger carrying aircraft that also carried the U.S. mails. We worked closely with the law enforcement community, the intelligence community, and the FAA to neutralize this threat, and concluded that, due to the lack of efficient technology to screen the number of parcels in the mails, we would have to divert parcel mail to cargo air carriers until the crisis abated.

Also, in 1989 when a Federal judge was killed by a mail bomb, the Postal Inspection Service assisted the U.S. Marshals Service in

establishing screening procedures for mail addressed to Federal judges throughout the country.

As part of our security effort, in April, 1989, the Postal Inspection Service completed security reviews at 23 U.S. airports. The reviews focused on the physical security of the airports, their mail facilities, and the mail itself, but problems identified were addressed with the airlines and airport authorities.

We have also worked closely with the Postal Union of the Americas, Spain, and Portugal, conducting reviews at several of their airports and developing an airport mail security and operations manual.

The International Air Transport Association and security representatives from the airline industry contributed significantly in this endeavor. While the primary focus was prevention of theft and pilferage of mail, there was a significant contribution to mail handling security in general.

Miss COLLINS. Michael, I want to interrupt you for one moment. We've been joined by Congressman Sanford Bishop, who is late to a meeting at the White House, and I'd like to allow him to make his opening remarks.

Mr. BISHOP. Pardon me for the interruption. Let me just welcome all three of you to this subcommittee. Let me thank the Chair of our subcommittee for holding these hearings. I think they are very timely, and they're very personal, in a sense, to me; and I would like to just indicate that I had a personal friend who was the victim of a mail bomb, an attorney in Savannah. Also, the closeness of the judge, Judge Vance in Alabama, was very, very striking, and the attempts that were made in Atlanta put all of us on notice, and we received warnings from the Postal Service.

I received a package after those warnings, which caused me a great deal of anxiety. It was unusually shaped, excessive postage, unprofessionally wrapped, no return address. The handwriting was unfamiliar, and it was marked "Personal." I was anxious, to say the least.

When the inspectors came out, it turned out that it had been several cassette tapes that were taped together, music tapes, by a friend who sent them without a return address. That was a relief, but it also underscored the need for the kinds of steps that you've undertaken, and I want to commend you for them and ask you to please remain diligent in that regard.

Let me just thank the subcommittee, the chairwoman, for conducting these hearings, and for all that you do.

Mr. HEARST. Thank you, Congressman.

Miss COLLINS. Thank you very much. All right. You may proceed.

Mr. HEARST. I'll conclude shortly.

At the FAA's invitation, we have worked closely with the International Civil Aviation Organization sub-group addressing the security of cargo, mail, and courier traffic. Meetings with the FAA's Intelligence Division, Civil Aviation Security Division, and research and development personnel have also proven beneficial and firmly established lines of communication between our two agencies.

To facilitate our law enforcement efforts, the Postal Service offers a reward of up to \$50,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of mail bombers. To the best of my knowl-

edge, we are the only agency to offer a reward in bombings as a standard procedure, although often rewards follow once cases are opened.

The Postal Inspection Service is committed to protecting our customers and employees, and we will continue our prevention and investigative efforts to eliminate bombs from the U.S. mails.

That concludes my prepared remarks. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hearst follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF K. MICHAEL HEARST, DEPUTY CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR, U.S.
POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE

Madam chairwoman, I am Michael Hearst, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector for Criminal Investigations of the United States Postal Inspection Service. I am accompanied by Inspector Daniel L. Mihalko and appreciate the opportunity to share with you our efforts in combating the serious and destructive crime of mail bombing.

As you know, the Postal Inspection Service is the law enforcement and audit arm of the United States Postal Service. We investigate and seek to prevent criminal attacks against our employees and customers, our Nation's postal system, and postal property. Postal inspectors have statutory authority to serve Federal warrants and subpoenas, and to make arrests for postal-related offenses. Our investigative responsibilities include such offenses as: armed robberies, murder of, or assault upon postal employees; burglaries; theft of mail; mailings of obscene matter, bombs, and drugs; and the use of the mails to swindle the public. The Postal Inspection Service is also the Office of the Inspector General for the Postal Service with authority to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in postal operations and programs.

The Postal Inspection Service is one of the oldest investigative agencies of the United States Government. For more than 200 years, we have investigated postal and postal-related crimes. For more than one-hundred years, postal inspectors have been enforcing title 18, United States Code, section 1716 (the mailing of injurious articles) in mail bomb investigations.

Of the 171 billion pieces of mail delivered by the Postal Service in 1993, only ten contained bombs. That is one in 17 billion! Of those ten pieces of mail, only six actually detonated. Over the last ten years, an average of 15 bombs per year have been sent through the United States mails. While even one mail bomb is too many, the likelihood of one of our customers receiving a mail bomb is extremely remote, and the possibility of injury from actual detonation is even less. Because specific motives (revenge, extortion, terrorism, love triangles, and business disputes) are usually associated with mail bombings, the chances of a postal customer being randomly targeted by a mail bomber are further substantially reduced. As rare an occurrence as they are, the prevention, detection, and investigation of mail bombs receive immediate and priority attention by the Postal Inspection Service.

The entire complement of 2100 postal inspectors has received basic mail bomb investigations training during their 14-week basic training at our academy in Potosi, Maryland. In addition, approximately 20 percent of our workforce has had advanced training in mail bomb investigative techniques. A national bomb investigations training course for postal inspectors is held annually in Virginia Beach, Virginia, and it is as close to the real thing as possible. Inspectors receive training in mail bomb crime scene and investigative techniques. Bomb experts from within the inspection service and outside provide hands-on instruction during this training course.

The Postal Inspection Service maintains five nationally recognized crime laboratories strategically located throughout the country and can immediately respond to any mail bomb crime scene location. Each of our thirty divisions has at least one bomb specialist. Bomb response specialists and teams are assigned specially-equipped vehicles containing portable x-ray machines and crime scene processing kits. Inspectors and mail bomb forensic experts from our crime laboratories are on call 24-hours a day.

We have found that our best defense against mail bombs is to educate postal customers and employees. A typical mail bomb is designed and packaged to withstand postal handling and to function only after the device is delivered—when the recipient opens the mail or removes an item from the mail. Common characteristics of mail bombs include:

Restricted endorsements such as "personal" or "private".

Addressee's name/title may be inaccurate.

Excessive postage.

Distorted handwriting, homemade label, or cut-and-paste lettering.

Misspelling of common words.

No return address or fictitious return address.

Cancellation or postmark may be different from return address.

Protruding wires or tin foil.

Oil stains or discoloration.

Letter bombs may feel rigid or appear uneven or lopsided.

Parcel bombs may have an irregular shape, soft spots, or bulges.

Unprofessional wrapping or excessive tape or string to secure the parcel.

Endorsements such as "Fragile—Handle With Care" or "RUSH—Do Not Delay."

Pressure or resistance when opening or removing contents.

Customers and employees are advised to notify us if these warning signs are present or if they suspect, for any reason, that the mail item may be a bomb. I have brought some pamphlets today that spell out these warnings.

Emphasis is placed on education and awareness in our prevention efforts. Postal inspectors offer mail bomb presentations to postal customers, members of the law enforcement community, and any official or organization believed to be a target of a mail bomb. Organizations or groups that may be at risk from a particular bomber—such as the university professors who were targeted in 1993—receive immediate attention from Postal Inspection Service bomb experts. In the wake of the Judge Vance mail bombing in Alabama in 1989 and three other bombings or attempts in Jacksonville, Florida, Savannah, and Atlanta, Georgia, inspectors conducted mail bomb prevention seminars in Atlanta for members of the NAACP, Federal judges, corporate executives, and members of local law enforcement agencies.

We also take precautions at postal facilities to identify suspect packages and to safeguard employees. Postal inspectors provide guidelines to postal employees through in-service talks and articles in employee publications that explain how to identify suspicious parcels. This training recently enabled a letter carrier in Dumfries, Virginia, to identify such a parcel in a collection box she was emptying. The parcel actually turned out to be a bomb, and the letter carrier took the appropriate action to notify inspectors, which prevented any possible harm to its intended victim.

Also in the area of education and awareness, the Postal Inspection Service has produced a two-part video on mail bomb prevention. This is an in-depth treatment of the subject produced specifically for officials, corporations, and organizations believed to be at risk of receiving an explosive device by mail. In addition, bomb posters illustrating characteristics of suspect parcels are made available to post offices and mail processing facilities throughout the country. These posters are also distributed to corporate mail centers and security offices upon request.

Our prevention and investigative efforts include coordination and cooperation with other law enforcement agencies. For example, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) had, in the past, made a bomb presentation to the Knox County attorney general's office in Knoxville, Tennessee. The Postal Inspection Service had previously made a bomb presentation to the United States Attorney's office, a former member of which is currently an official of the Knox County attorney general's office. As a result of these presentations, a suspicious parcel was identified on March 1, 1994, and determined to contain a mail bomb.

An incident occurring in December 1993, which included a series of bombings in upstate New York, further demonstrates the commitment and cooperation of ATF, the FBI, the Postal Inspection Service, the New York State police, and various county and city law enforcement agencies. The case included the possibility of terrorism in a bombing case in which the United States mails were used. Tragically, five murders also occurred. In this case, five bombs were delivered to separate victims; only one was handled by the Postal Service. In view of our common objective, all of the agencies agreed ATF would be the lead agency with the other agencies contributing their respective expertise. As a result of this cooperative effort, the case was solved in a matter of hours. Those responsible for these bombings are currently in jail awaiting trial.

In another case, the diligent efforts of postal inspectors led to the arrest and conviction of conspirators in a mail bomb case in Alaska in 1991. The intended victim was a key witness in a murder trial. The bomb killed the witness's father and severely injured his mother. In a 1993 Nevada case, a mail bomb critically injured a highway patrol officer in his home. An investigation by postal inspectors led to the arrest of two men suspected of mailing the bomb.

Recently, a defendant who was extradited from Israel for the 1980 Manhattan Beach, California, mail bomb murder of a 32-year old secretary was convicted following a jury trial in United States district court and sentenced to life in prison. Another defendant, charged with aiding and abetting in commissioning the mail bombing, was recently arrested by postal inspectors as a fugitive in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, and returned to the United States to stand trial. The first defendant's wife remains in custody in Israel pending extradition to the United States. All three individuals are tied to the Jewish Defense League (JDL) and are suspects in a series of other politically motivated bombings.

The large volume of mail handled by the Postal Service (over 550 million pieces per day) and the large number of facilities (39,400) make the guaranteed detection of a mail bomb unfeasible. Nevertheless, the Postal Inspection Service makes every effort to prevent and detect bombs in the mail. Our ability to prevent all mail bombings is severely limited by a number of factors. First, the Postal Service carries less than half of all parcels moved within the United States. Our efforts, therefore, do not cover the majority of parcels delivered by private carriers, such as in the upstate New York bombings. Second, constitutional restrictions, Federal criminal statutes, postal treaties and conventions, Federal court decisions, and Postal Service regulations embodying these authorities limit our ability to examine carefully all parcels deposited in the United States mails. Even without these restrictions, the logistics of moving 171 billion pieces of mail and the lack of technology to quickly detect bombs, prevents the Postal Service from guaranteeing protection to our customers. Third, screening of all parcels is logistically unfeasible with respect to the materiel and personnel required to accomplish the task. However, we continue to work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in implementing security procedures to reduce the likelihood a mail bomb would be carried on a passenger aircraft. The details of these efforts are not available for public disclosure.

We do, however, act quickly to inspect suspect packages in accordance with regulations contained in the Domestic Mail Manual. Under these regulations, any specific piece of mail reasonably believed to contain a bomb may be examined. The regulations were intended to authorize the emergency examination of a "ticking parcel" and are not broad enough to permit full inspection of large quantities of mail.

High threat situations also give rise to the selected examination of mail. During high visibility special events, such as the Democratic and Republican conventions, the 1990 Goodwill games, and the 1984 Olympics, we assisted in the screening of large volumes of mail prior to delivery with the consent of the addressees. Additionally, postal inspectors and our crime laboratory personnel maintain close liaison with international and domestic organizations for the exchange of mail bomb information and intelligence.

During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the possibility existed that a state-sponsored terrorist group might use the mails to attack passenger-carrying aircraft that also carried the United States mails. We worked closely with the law enforcement community, the intelligence community, and the FAA to neutralize this threat and concluded that due to the lack of efficient technology to screen the number of parcels in the mails, we would have to divert parcel mail to cargo air carriers until the crisis abated. Also, in 1989 when a Federal judge was killed by a mail bomb, the Postal Inspection Service assisted the United States Marshals Service in establishing screening procedures for mail addressed to Federal judges throughout the country.

As part of our security effort, in April, 1989, the Postal Inspection Service completed security reviews at 23 United States airports. The reviews focused on the physical security of the airports, their mail facilities, and the mail itself. Problems identified were addressed with the airlines and airport authorities.

We have also worked closely with the Postal Union of the Americas, Spain and Portugal (PUASP) conducting reviews at several of their airports and developing an airport mail security and operations manual. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) and security representatives from the industry contributed significantly in this endeavor. While the primary focus was prevention of theft and pilferage of mail, there was a significant contribution to mail handling security in general.

At the FAA's invitation, we have worked closely with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) sub-group addressing the security of cargo, mail, and courier traffic. Meetings with the FAA's intelligence division, civil aviation security division, and research and development personnel have also proven beneficial and firmly established lines of communication between our two agencies.

To facilitate our law enforcement efforts, the Postal Service offers a reward of up to \$50,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of mail bombers. To

the best of my knowledge, we are the only agency to offer a reward in bombings as a standard procedure.

The Postal Inspection Service is committed to protecting our customers and employees, and we will continue our prevention and investigative efforts to eliminate bombs from the United States mail. That concludes my prepared remarks. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Miss COLLINS. Well, I thank you very much, Mr. Hearst. Your testimony is very reassuring.

In view of the fact that the people who have had training to help them spot potential mail bombs have been very successful in spotting them. Are there any plans to make sure that all postal employees are so trained?

Mr. HEARST. We do try to train as many employees as we can throughout the country. Our inspectors regard this as a very high priority. Of course, we have to balance that with operational considerations, but we do take it very seriously, and it generates a lot of activity.

Although we do get something in the neighborhood of 15 mail bombs per year, we do know that our efforts are working by the number of incidents and reports that we get from postal employees where no bomb is present.

You know, we don't begrudge that, but every inspector, myself included, can recall getting phone calls at 2 o'clock in the morning about some suspicious parcel that a postal employee had seen on a belt or is handling. Very often those turn out to be harmless. They are battery operated toys that have gone off in the mail or automatic umbrellas, those kinds of things.

Still, we go out. We respond. Employees know what to do with those. In fact, we do get a lot of those incidents. So I think it does show that it's working.

For example, last year we had 320 such incidents, the year before 513, and the year before that something like 930. So that's, I think, a sign that our efforts are working, because we are getting contacted by postal employees.

Miss COLLINS. You stated that individuals or organizations that consider themselves potential targets for a mail bomb can receive educational literature or arrange for formal training for postal inspectors. Do you know how many individuals or organizations took advantage of this training opportunity last year?

Mr. HEARST. I don't have that information handy. We could get that for you.

[The information referred to follows:]

During fiscal year 1993, there were a total of 488 mail bomb presentations made by postal inspectors to the following organizations:

- Judiciary Groups
- U.S. Congresswoman and Staff
- U.S. Senator and Staff
- Television Stations
- Postal Employees
- Law Enforcement Groups
- Private Businesses
- Schools and Universities
- Federal and State Agencies

Miss COLLINS. Were there many?

Mr. HEARST. There were quite a few, yes.

Miss COLLINS. There were quite a few?

Mr. HEARST. Then, of course, when you have an incident, people become extremely sensitive to mail bombings. For example, back in 1989 after the Judge Vance mail bombings, as I indicated, Federal judges rightly were concerned about that. So we get contacted by people. Anytime there is an incident, there is always an upswing in the kind of publicity and attention to that. So we do get calls.

If we get calls by people and they have some legitimate concerns, we will respond to that and go out and train them.

Miss COLLINS. Well, it's all very encouraging. I have one final recommendation, as a layperson. Have you considered using dogs?

Mr. HEARST. We do use dogs from time to time.

Miss COLLINS. You do use them?

Mr. HEARST. Yes, we do.

Miss COLLINS. Thank you very much.

Mr. HEARST. You're welcome.

Miss COLLINS. Our next witness is Edmund Kelso, Unit Chief, Bomb Data Center, from the FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Welcome, Mr. Kelso.

STATEMENT OF EDMUND KELSO, UNIT CHIEF, BOMB DATA CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. KELSO. Thank you. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman, subcommittee members, and staff.

My name is Edmund Kelso, and I am the Unit Chief at the Bomb Data Center which is part of the FBI's Training Division, located at the FBI Academy in Quantico, VA. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today to speak about bomb matters as they relate to the FBI's Bomb Data Center.

The National Bomb Data Center was instituted in 1970, and the administration of this program was transferred to the FBI in July 1972. The FBI Bomb Data Center took responsibility for technology transfer, publications and training in 1976.

As you are aware, Congress designated the FBI Bomb Data Center as the administrator and financial sponsor of the Hazardous Devices School, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, in March 1981. Under congressional mandate of the Uniform Crime Reporting Act, the Bomb Data Center is the repository for bombing statistics as reported by local and State public safety agencies throughout the United States. These statistics are disseminated by the FBI through its annual Bomb Summary.

If I could draw your attention, I have made these available. This is last year's Bomb Summary, and within the Summary there is a two-page section on the Postal Service to show the relationship that we have in reporting between the two agencies.

The Bomb Data Center is a comprehensive unit of the Training Division located at the FBI Academy, Quantico, VA. The mission encompasses five areas of responsibility: (1) The technical training of public safety bomb disposal technicians; (2) technical research in render safe equipment, techniques, and the positive use of explosives; (3) technical on site support during special events and crisis management situations; (4) the preparation of explosives related publications and bombing incident summaries through a broad

base of local, State, Federal and international agencies; and (5) foreign cooperation with other bomb data centers and allied agencies.

Look at technical training. During March 1987, an FBI Bomb Data Center sponsored conference of bomb squad commanders and bomb disposal experts was convened at the Hazardous Devices School to construct national guidelines for acceptable professional practices for bomb technicians. Guidelines were established for performance, candidate selection, training/certification, equipment/tools, and operational response.

The major focus of all training is the use of remote techniques and risk reduction equipment. Candidates for Hazardous Devices School must have a written certification from their agency that essential safety equipment, as outlined in the guidelines, will be available upon graduation or will be included in the agency budget. Effective law enforcement does not rely on luck, but rather on progressively developed practices and techniques.

The Hazardous Devices School, funded and administered by the Bomb Data Center, is the sole source for training civilian bomb technicians in the United States. The Bomb Data Center operates the school in cooperation with the U.S. Army. HDS offers two types of courses: A 4-week basic course and a 1-week refresher course.

These courses are designed to train and certify local public safety personnel as bomb technicians. The basic course combines classroom and range instruction in explosives technology, electric circuitry and components of explosive devices, non-electric components and primary use of special equipment for the detection and handling of explosive devices, and render safe equipment and techniques. Graduates of the basic course are strongly encouraged to attend a refresher course every 36 months.

The refresher course reviews basic principles and explores current developments in bomb disposal. The bomb technicians are placed in a variety of simulations which challenge their technical ability.

Each year, specialized Bomb Data Center seminars are held throughout the country for Hazardous Devices School graduates. These seminars provide recent information on construction and utilization of improvised explosive devices, techniques for remote neutralization, discussion of research and development, and a review of technical equipment.

The Bomb Data Center manages a variety of research programs involving remote render safe technology, explosives detection, diversionary devices and neutralization techniques for explosive devices. Based on the success of the first projects, other Federal agencies have contributed funding to a variety of explosives related projects, with the Bomb Data Center as project manager.

Final research and development reports must be approved by the Bomb Data Center and, once approved, are distributed to the funding agency and to other interested agencies.

Operational support: Bomb Data Center personnel and state-of-the-art remote render safe equipment, as well as certified field special agent bomb technicians, can provide assistance in the following situations wherein the use of explosives might be anticipated: (1) Major case/crisis management situations. When the situation involves FBI or task force jurisdiction, raid or arrest, planning

should include the availability of the local public safety bomb squad.

(2) Special event: Local or state law enforcement is usually the lead agency in physical security matters, with FBI jurisdiction, aligned with terrorism potential.

The response equipment consists of two self-contained bomb disposal vehicles and two full containment vessels on trailers. The vehicles contain robots, bomb suits, X-rays and disruption equipment. The FBI does not have a primary render safe responsibility. However, the equipment can be used to support public safety agencies in a remote render safe operation.

Publications: The Bomb Data Center is responsible for the collection, collation, and dissemination of up-to-date statistical and technical information concerning improvised explosive devices, render safe procedures, explosives research, and technical equipment used by bomb technicians.

The Bomb Data Center compiles and publishes an annual statistical summary on bombing incidents throughout the United States. Data utilized in these summaries is reported to the FBI via an incident reporting form provided to public safety agencies.

Since the primary thrust of this hearing concerns devices that are mailed or shipped, I brought with me some statistical information in this area. In 1993 there were a total of 31 reported incidents, either mailed or shipped, which shows an increase of 21 incidents from the 1992 total of 10. The 31 incidents represents 21 actual and 10 attempted devices. These incidents resulted in 5 deaths and 16 injuries.

Foreign cooperation: The Bomb Data Center functions as a clearinghouse for information on bombing incidents and new render safe technology as reported in the United States and overseas. Contact is maintained with the eight other members of the International Bomb Data Center community: England, Canada, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Switzerland, and Spain.

The Bomb Data Center responded to the Persian Gulf War and the resultant sensitivity to potential terrorism by individuals using improvised explosive devices by establishing an emergency broadcast network. This network provides a means for immediate notification of bomb squads throughout the United States regarding intelligence developed about terrorist devices or methods.

The Bomb Data Center works closely with all local, State, and Federal agencies and the military to share information on bombing incidents and new technology. The Center works closely with the U.S. Army Forces Command in Atlanta, GA, to assist in the timely resolution of all actual or potential bombing situations.

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelso follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDMUND KELSO, UNIT CHIEF, BOMB DATA CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Good morning madam chairwoman, subcommittee members, and staff. My name is Edmund Kelso and I am the unit chief at the Bomb Data Center which is part of the FBI's Training Division located at the FBI Academy in Quantico. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today to speak about bomb matters as they relate to the FBI's Bomb Data Center.

The National Bomb Data Center (NBDC) was instituted in 1970 and the administration of the program was transferred to the FBI in July 1972. The FBI Bomb Data Center (BDC) took responsibility for technology transfer, publications and training in 1976. As you are aware, Congress designated the FBI BDC as the administrator and financial sponsor of the Hazardous Devices School (HDS), Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama in March of 1981. Under congressional mandate of the Uniform Crime Reporting Act, the BDC is the repository for bombing statistics as reported by local and State public safety agencies throughout the United States. These statistics are disseminated by the FBI through its annual bomb summary.

The BDC is a comprehensive unit of the Training Division located at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia. The mission encompasses five areas of responsibility: 1) the technical training of public safety bomb disposal technicians; 2) technical research in render safe equipment, techniques, and the positive use of explosives; 3) technical on-site support during special events and crisis management situations; 4) the preparation of explosives-related publications and bombing incident summaries through a broad base of local, State, Federal and international agencies; 5) foreign cooperation with other bomb data centers and allied agencies.

Technical Training

During March 1987, an FBI BDC sponsored conference of bomb squad commanders and bomb disposal experts was convened at HDS to construct national guidelines for acceptable professional practice for bomb technicians. Guidelines were established for performance, candidate selection, training/certification, equipment/tools, and operational response. The major focus of all training is the use of remote techniques and risk reduction equipment. Candidates for HDS must have a written certification from their agency that essential safety equipment, as outlined in the guidelines, will be available upon graduation or will be included in the agency budget. Effective law enforcement does not rely on luck, but rather on progressively developed practices and techniques.

The HDS, funded and administered by the FBI through the BDC, is the sole source for training civilian bomb technicians in the United States. The BDC operates the school in cooperation with the U.S. Army. HDS offers two types of courses: a four-week basic course and a one-week refresher course.

These courses are designed to train and certify local public safety personnel as bomb technicians. The basic course combines classroom and range instruction in explosives technology, electric circuitry and components of explosive devices, nonelectric components and primary use of special equipment for the detection and handling of explosive devices, and render safe equipment and techniques. Graduates of the basic course are strongly encouraged to attend a refresher course every 36 months.

The refresher course reviews basic principles and explores current developments in bomb disposal. The bomb technicians are placed in a variety of simulations which challenge their technical ability.

Each year, specialized BDC seminars are held throughout the country for HDS graduates. These seminars provide recent information on construction and utilization of improvised explosive devices, techniques for remote neutralization, discussion of research and development and a review of new technical equipment.

Research and Development

The BDC manages a variety of research programs involving remote render safe technology, explosives detection, diversionary devices and neutralization techniques for explosive devices. Based on the success of the first projects, other Federal agencies have contributed funding to a variety of explosives-related projects, with the BDC as project manager. Final research and development reports must be approved by the BDC and, once approved, are distributed to the funding agency, and to other interested agencies.

Operational Support

BDC personnel and state-of-the-art remote render safe equipment as well as certified field special agent bomb technicians, can provide assistance in the following situations wherein the use of explosives might be anticipated:

- 1) Major case/crisis management situations—when the situation involves FBI or task force jurisdiction, raid or arrest, planning should include the availability of the local public safety bomb squad.
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Foreign Cooperation

The BDC functions as a clearinghouse for information on bombing incidents and new render safe technology as reported in the United States and overseas. Contact is maintained with the eight other members of the international bomb data center community: England, Canada, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Switzerland, and Spain.

The BDC responded to the Persian Gulf War and the resultant sensitivity to potential terrorism by individuals using improvised explosive devices by establishing an emergency broadcast network (EBN). This network provides a means for immediate notification of bomb squads throughout the United States regarding intelligence developed about terrorist devices or methods. The BDC works closely with all local, State and Federal agencies and the military to share information on bombing incidents and new technology. The center works closely with the U.S. Army Forces Command in Atlanta, Georgia to assist in the timely resolution of all actual or potential bombing situations.

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.

Miss COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelso. We've been joined at this time by Congressman Benjamin Gilman of New York. Do you have any opening statement, Ben?

Mr. GILMAN. Well, Madam Chairman, I just want to commend you for undertaking this hearing, something that the entire Nation is concerned about. Every time we have a rash of these bombings, people want to know what we're doing to prevent it, and I appreciate your bringing these experts together to give us the benefit of their knowledge.

I hope that you're continuing, and I address this to the panel—that you're continuing to look for more effective methods of sorting out suspected packages. I know here in the Congress they have a fairly good inspection system, and I hope there is—that those systems will be generally applied throughout the Nation to prevent any deaths from occurring as a result of these kind of bombs.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Miss COLLINS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Kelso, you stated that the Bomb Data Center is the repository for bombing statistics. In your analysis, have you noticed any particular pattern, geographic area or profile for a potential mail bomber?

Mr. KELSO. In reviewing that, I don't see any particular pattern geographically. I see a tremendous increase, not so much of the de-

vices that are actually mailed. Because we have about the same amount as we did last year, but I do see an increase over the years of devices that are being placed in mail boxes, either at residences or businesses. Most of that, I believe, is just vandalism, from the information that we have.

Miss COLLINS. Not the mail boxes that people put mail into, but mail boxes—

Mr. KELSO. Mail boxes and residential mail boxes.

Miss COLLINS. I see. Are you satisfied with the level of coordination among Federal agencies in investigating mail bombings or do you have any suggestion as to how it can perhaps be improved?

Mr. KELSO. Yes, I'm very happy with it. I think we have a lot of good liaison. We're constantly in contact with each other, exchanging information, asking questions about what's being done.

I know, with the bomb summary that I referred to earlier, you'll see in there also an article with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms where we exchange information. Matter of fact, one of Mr. Brown's colleagues comes down to the Bomb Data Center periodically, and we exchange statistical information.

Miss COLLINS. I notice that you urge them to take refresher courses every 36 months, but you give the seminars every year. If something new, new in technology, comes up, do you immediately notify Postal Service or the people who would need to know?

Mr. KELSO. Yes, ma'am. We have other bulletins that we put out. If we were to come across any new technology, we have very specialized technician bulletins that only go to bomb squad personnel; but as soon as we would find out any information of that type, it would immediately be put out in one of those bulletins, and then we have an established mailing list.

Miss COLLINS. OK. This will be my final question. I may have to come back to you. I didn't write it down. I'll come back to you on that, but thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. KELSO. Thank you.

Miss COLLINS. Jim Brown from the Explosives Division, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Welcome, Mr. Brown.

STATEMENT OF JAMES L. BROWN, EXPLOSIVES DIVISION, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

Mr. BROWN. Thank you.

Madam Chairwoman, members of the committee. My responsibility as Chief of the Explosives Division is to oversee ATF's explosives enforcement efforts. I am here today to discuss ATF's capabilities and how they relate to the investigation of mail bombs.

A principle mission of ATF is to reduce the hazard to persons or property arising from the misuse of unsafe or unsecured storage of explosives materials. Certainly, explosives have their place in society, and reasonable access to them is balanced by law and regulation, but obviously, there are those with a propensity for violence involving explosives, as the following statistics show.

From 1979 to 1992, over 21,000 bombings and attempted bombings were reported to ATF. The pinnacle was reached in 1992, with 2,989 such incidents reported, a 20-percent increase over the previ-

ous year. The incidents for 1992 alone resulted in 26 deaths, 349 injuries, and \$12.5 million in property damage.

From January 1979 to December 1993, there were 225 actual and attempted mail bomb incidents reported. These incidents cover those sent through the U.S. mails and those sent by other commercial means. The bombings resulted in 17 deaths, 124 injuries, and nearly \$1 million in property damage.

In calendar year 1993, the number of bombings involving the U.S. mails totaled 15 and resulted in injuries to 11 individuals. Revenge is the primary motive, and pipe bombs are the predominant devices used, accounting for nearly half the incidents.

Although these incidents account for only approximately 1 percent of all the bombings in the United States, these crimes strike at the very heart of a free society, promoting fear and anxiety among the nation's citizens.

In promoting its jurisdictional role, ATF has committed itself to providing investigative assistance to Federal, State, and local law enforcement in their efforts to curtail violence involving explosives. Normally, there are several related violations under the jurisdiction of the investigating agencies, but experience has shown that in those cases involving concurrent jurisdiction, a joint effort ensures the most comprehensive and effective investigation.

This was demonstrated in upstate New York in December 1993 where authorities were investigating the delivery of six destructive devices disguised as packages. One of the packages was mailed, and the other five were delivered by commercial means. Four of the devices detonated, killing five people and injuring two, all of whom were distant members of the same family.

Two suspects have been charged as a result of this investigation, and they were ultimately linked to an unlawful purchase in Kentucky of 50 detonators and 55 pounds of dynamite, individual sticks of which were used in these devices.

The task force approach is being applied as well in the investigation of the university airline bomber, or Unabom who is a serial bomber responsible for 14 related bombings since 1978. One death and 21 injuries have resulted from these bombings. The most recent bombings occurred in 1993 and involved a world renowned geneticist and a professor of computer science who were victims of mail packages that exploded.

One of the most successful joint investigations to date involved the deaths in 1989 of the U.S. Court of Appeals judge in Birmingham, AL, and the attorney in Savannah, GA, due to mail bombs. The defendant in this case received seven life sentences and 400 years' imprisonment as a result of this joint investigation.

Clearly, it is the combined talents and resources of the participating agencies that are vital to the apprehension of those responsible for such crimes. The specialized support ATF brings to these investigations includes our National Response Team or the NRT. The NRT is composed of veteran special agents having post-blast and fire cause and origin expertise, forensic chemists and explosives technology experts who can respond to the scene of a major explosion within 24 hours. The NRT was activated to assist the investigation in upstate New York in December 1993, as well as the investigation of the World Trade Center bombing.

Lending support to ATF's explosion enforcement efforts is its national laboratory system. As well as providing a full range of traditional forensic analysis, these laboratories routinely examine intact and functioned explosive devices and explosives debris in order to identify device components and the explosives used.

Also lending support is a cadre of ATF explosives technology experts. These experts construct facsimiles of explosive and incendiary devices, render destructive device determinations, provide expert analyses of intact and functioned explosive and incendiary devices, and provide on site technical assistance.

A comprehensive database called the Explosives Incidents System is also maintained to support law enforcement efforts. From this database, investigators can derive details from reported explosives incidents that are helpful in determining motives, patterns, trends, and signatures.

Augmenting this specialized support are ATF's training programs for law enforcement personnel in advanced aspects of post-blast investigation. Training is also provided to educate the general public on how to prepare for and react to suspect packages, bomb threats, and the like.

ATF is fortunate to have the working relationship it does with its Federal, State, and local counterparts. It is imperative that this cooperative environment remain constant, given the growing crime problem we face.

Although law enforcement can never eliminate the threat posed by explosives, ATF is totally committed to developing and sharing with all law enforcement any investigative procedures and technology toward curbing the misuse of this significant problem.

I thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I will answer any questions you may have at this time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]

JAMES L. BROWN, EXPLOSIVES DIVISION, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND
FIREARMS

Madam chairwoman, members of the committee. My responsibility as Chief of the Explosives Division is to oversee ATF's explosives enforcement efforts. I am here today to discuss ATF's capabilities in this area and how these capabilities enable us to respond to mail bombs.

The investigation of explosives-related incidents has been a high priority of ATF since the passage of the Federal explosives laws enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The laws address the manufacture, distribution, storage, and importation of explosive materials, and encompass certain Federal offenses relative to the criminal use of explosives.

From 1979 to 1992, over 21,000 bombings and attempted bombings were reported to ATF. The pinnacle was reached in 1992, with 2,989 such incidents reported—a 20-percent increase over the previous year. These incidents resulted in 26 deaths, 349 injuries, and \$12.5 million in property damage.

From January 1979 to December 1993, there were 225 actual and attempted mail bomb incidents reported. These incidents cover those sent through the U.S. mails as well as those sent by other commercial means. The bombings resulted in 17 deaths, 124 injuries, and nearly \$1 million property damage. In calendar year 1993, the number of bombings involving the U.S. mails totaled 15 and resulted in injuries to 11 individuals. Revenge is the primary motive, and pipe bombs are the predominant device used, accounting for nearly half the incidents.

Although these incidents only account for approximately 1 percent of all the bombings in the United States, these crimes strike at the very heart of a free society, promoting fear and anxiety among this Nation's citizens.

It is understandable, then, the public's reaction to the incidents in upstate New York in December 1993 involving the delivery of six destructive devices disguised as

packages. One of the packages was mailed, and the other five were delivered by commercial means. Four of the devices detonated, killing five people and injuring two, all of whom were distant members of the same family. Two suspects have been charged as a result of the investigation. They were ultimately linked to an unlawful purchase in Kentucky of 50 detonators and 55 pounds of dynamite, individual sticks of which were used in the devices.

The public was no less outraged just 6 months earlier when a world-renowned geneticist and a computer science professor were victims of mailed packages that exploded. Evidence collected at the scenes of both incidents have led investigators to believe that the bombings are the work of the university airline bomber, a serial bomber responsible for 12 other related bombings since 1978. One death and 21 injuries have resulted from these bombings. A multiagency effort has been underway since 1982 to investigate these incidents. In October 1993, a \$1 million reward was offered for any information leading to the arrest of the individual(s) responsible for the Unabom incidents.

We also cannot forget the U.S. Court of Appeals judge in Birmingham, Alabama, and the attorney in Savannah, Georgia, who in 1989 lost their lives as a result of mailed bombs. The defendant in this case received seven life terms and 400 years' imprisonment as a result of the multiagency investigative effort.

The key words here are multiagency effort. Normally, several related violations fall under the jurisdiction of the investigating agencies. In fact, in 1973, guidelines were established at the Federal level between ATF, the FBI, and the Postal Inspection Service that allocated investigative jurisdiction over certain offenses involving the unlawful use of explosives. But experience has shown that in those cases involving concurrent jurisdiction, a joint effort ensures the most comprehensive and effective investigation.

In complement to this, ATF and the Postal Inspection Service entered into an agreement in 1990 with regard to mailed bombs directed at the respective properties or functions under the jurisdiction of each agency. Each immediately notifies the other of any report received of an incident involving explosives or an explosive or incendiary device sent through the mail. If, in the course of an ATF investigation, evidence is found that any such explosive or incendiary device was sent through the mail, ATF immediately notifies the Postal Inspection Service, and a joint investigation ensues.

This task force approach applies beyond the crime scene examination, to include the development of investigative strategies and the examination of evidence. And although not specifically mentioned in the agreement, this approach also carries over to incidents directed at properties or functions under the jurisdiction of the FBI.

Clearly, it was the combined talents and resources of the participating agencies in the investigations in upstate New York, Alabama, and Georgia that led to the apprehension of those responsible for the crimes. Such a timely, coordinated response helps to meet the challenges faced at such major crime scenes.

This theory of a coordinated response was the basis for the development of ATF's National Response Team (NRT). The immediate deployment of such a highly trained and specialized team has proved to be extremely effective. An NRT was deployed to assist in the investigation in upstate New York as well as the investigation of the World Trade Center bombing.

This response capability consists of four teams based in the northeast, midwest, southeast, and western sections of the United States. Each team can respond within 24 hours to assist other Federal, State, and local law enforcement as well as fire service personnel in onsite investigations. This specialized concept is the only one of its kind offered by a Federal law enforcement agency.

Each team is composed of veteran special agents having postblast and fire cause and origin expertise, forensic chemists, and technical experts. The team works alongside other Federal and State and local officers in reconstructing the scene, identifying the origin of the blast or fire, conducting interviews, and sifting through debris to obtain evidence.

Providing support to ATF's investigative efforts is its national laboratory system, which holds the distinction of being the first Federal laboratory system accredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors. Three multidisciplinary laboratories located in Walnut Creek, California, Rockville, Maryland, and Atlanta, Georgia, support ATF's explosives enforcement program. As well as providing the full range of traditional forensic analysis, these laboratories routinely examine intact and functioned explosive devices and explosives debris in order to identify device components and the explosives used.

Technical assistance in support of ATF's explosives enforcement efforts is also provided by a cadre of explosives technology experts. These experts construct facsimiles of explosive and incendiary devices, render destructive device determinations, provide expert analyses of intact and functioned explosive/incendiary devices, and provide onsite technical assistance.

Additional programs have been developed by ATF to provide specialized support to its counterparts on the Federal, State, and local levels. One such program is the explosives incidents system (EXIS), a comprehensive computerized source of information pertinent to explosives incidents nationwide. Developed in 1975, EXIS can be used to match targets and motives of bombings as well as similar explosive devices, and can show trends or patterns in a given area, State, or throughout the Nation. EXIS currently contains 180,861 detailed records from 52,780 explosives-related investigations. EXIS is also ATF's repository for information regarding thefts, losses, recoveries, and seizures of explosive materials nationwide.

Another program investigators may avail themselves of is ATF's explosives tracing capability. Through a trace, ATF can assist investigators in determining the origin and identification of explosive materials. If given the proper identifying data, ATF can trace explosives from the manufacturer to the last retail sale by a licensed dealer.

Another invaluable tool is criminal investigative analysis, which is provided through the FBI's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. ATF agents assigned to the center are trained in the techniques of preparing analyses on bombers to assist law enforcement in identifying possible suspects based on characteristics particular to bombings. Related concepts can also be successfully applied to other areas such as investigative strategies, suspect interviewing techniques, and prosecutorial strategies.

ATF has also been long committed to promoting an advanced level of expertise through training programs designed to foster interagency cooperation and enhance law enforcement's investigative capabilities. ATF provides training in advanced aspects of postblast scene investigation to State and local officers. Since 1982, over 1,000 officers have attended. And because of our acknowledged expertise in this area, ATF is now regularly called upon to provide like training to State Department embassy officials worldwide, as well as to foreign security officials and investigators.

ATF's explosives-related training is not limited to law enforcement, however. We have long recognized a need for the general public to be educated in and have a practical understanding of how to prepare for and react to suspect packages, bomb threats, and bombings.

Proper education, training, and preparation by the private sector can maximize personal safety and minimize property damage. To this end, ATF regularly conducts seminars on bomb threat management and physical security planning, as well as on the identification of suspect packages and mailed bombs.

Reasonable access to explosives is balanced by law and regulation. Unfortunately, law enforcement cannot limit access to other materials used everyday and for legitimate purposes. Anything and everything is available to anyone who wishes to manufacture an explosive device, which can be as simple or as complicated as he/she desires. Materials used include fertilizer, gasoline, matches, black powder, pipe, watches, electrical wire, batteries, model rocket engines/igniters, string, and alarm clocks.

Although restrictions on most of these items are impossible, ATF has taken steps and made recommendations to Treasury for tighter controls on explosives in an effort to deny the criminal element the principal component of destructive devices.

As a complement to this effort, ATF is a participant of a worldwide initiative, under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization, to seek ratification of an international treaty that would require the placement of a chemical compound in plastic explosives to facilitate detection.

ATF is committed to fulfilling its congressional mandate to provide the most effective and professional investigative response available to explosives incidents. The success ATF has achieved could not have been accomplished without the close working relationships and cooperative environment that has been established with its counterparts. ATF is confident that it can continue to draw upon this ability to work in partnership—combining its expertise and teaching and learning from each other—to counter the violence that prevails.

Miss COLLINS. Thank you very much.

I want to go back to Mr. Kelso. Mr. Kelso, the five bombings—only one was through the U.S. mail that you mentioned last year, New York.

Mr. KELSO. I don't believe I referred to that.

Miss COLLINS. That wasn't you? It was Mr. Brown?

Mr. BROWN. I commented on it, ma'am.

Miss COLLINS. Mr. Brown? OK. Well, this question is still for you, Mr. Kelso. I imagine you will still have jurisdiction over, say, UPS or Federal Express or the other private carriers.

Mr. KELSO. It would just depend on—In the mail, obviously, the FBI does not have any jurisdiction, and then it would depend on where the actual package was delivered as to whether we would have jurisdiction or not. It may just be a local jurisdiction.

Miss COLLINS. I see. You come in when you're requested? Is that it?

Mr. KELSO. Yes, ma'am.

Miss COLLINS. I see. Mr. Hearst and Mr. Brown, do you have jurisdiction over the private carriers?

Mr. HEARST. We do not. We only have jurisdiction in mail bombings, those that are carried through the mail. We do not have jurisdiction over bombs that are carried by UPS, Fed Ex or any of the other private couriers.

Miss COLLINS. What do they do? We should have had them here. We should have had someone from the private carriers here, because in that New York incident five—four out of the five were private carriers. Is that right?

Mr. BROWN. That's correct. One was delivered by taxi, four by common carriers, and then one by the U.S. mail. In response to your question, ATF would have primary jurisdiction if it involved a common carrier. Again, as Mr. Kelso indicated—

Miss COLLINS. What is a common carrier?

Mr. BROWN. Well, it could be UPS, Federal Express, or any other common carrier private company. As Mr. Kelso indicated, the intended victim or target often determines who has jurisdiction. There is a memorandum of understanding between ATF, the FBI, and the Postal Inspection Service on who has primary jurisdiction on particular types of incidents.

Certainly, the Postal has primary jurisdiction if it is sent through the mail. ATF has primary jurisdiction if it's sent by either common carrier or other typical bombings that do not involve jurisdictions that the FBI has, such as terrorists or directed at colleges and universities or other things that are specified in the MOU. Then we have to determine who has the primary jurisdiction in a particular incident.

Miss COLLINS. Does that take a long time?

Mr. BROWN. Well, normally not. In the one in upstate New York, I think initially, if you're familiar with the facts of that case, it would appear that initially maybe terrorists were involved. We had six different devices that went off or at least were received in a 3-hour period of time. So you've got to determine who has jurisdiction.

We were there. The FBI was there. Postal was there. Certainly, all the State and local agencies that were affected in these various jurisdictions were there, but we eventually determined who had jurisdiction. ATF had jurisdiction in five, Postal in the other. We worked it as a task force, and it was very successful, and the subjects were in jail by the next morning.

Miss COLLINS. I'm sorry that I did not invite the common carriers to this hearing. Can any of you tell me what kind of cooperation you're having with the common carriers? Are you—because it seems that increasingly they are carrying an awful lot of packages and mail, and I wonder what kind of protection they are giving the public and their employees also.

Can anybody answer that? Do you train them in the—No?

Mr. HEARST. No, we don't.

Mr. BROWN. We don't routinely. We have provided training to several of the common carriers, as well as to businesses and to corporations and so forth, I'm sure, just like the Postal Service has, on detection of certain types of packages and so forth and suspicious things that might be in the mail system or through the common carrier system; but we do not routinely train them, as we do our own people.

Miss COLLINS. Do they ever request training or information? They do?

Mr. BROWN. Oh, yes.

Mr. KELSO. We've had some occasions where corporations—We have a poster very similar to what you've seen that we put out, and it shows different—a parcel package type bomb and a letter bomb, and we made it the size that people could put this up in their mail room. We've had a lot of requests, particularly following any type of mail incident or parcel that's come through UPS, Federal Express. Then we get an influx of requests for this type of information and for this poster, so that they can put it up in their mail room.

Miss COLLINS. Well, I'm very glad to hear that. I'm wondering whether, for the protection of the public, we should insist that common carriers have intensive training. Do they—When they come to you for training, Mr. Kelso, the local authorities, do they pay? Are they charged for that training?

Mr. KELSO. No. We do not charge them for it. When we have training at our school, the police department, the agency that goes to that school for the basic training, must pay their own travel and per diem, but we supply all the training free of charge. Then the refresher class, the FBI pays for their travel and per diem to go to the refresher class.

Then any type of training that we would provide outside the corporations or any carrier, we would provide that free of charge also.

Miss COLLINS. Well, that's good, because that way small cities and towns could afford to avail themselves of that.

Mr. KELSO. We have 82 trained bomb technicians. These are FBI agents who have gone through the bomb technician training program located throughout the United States. Upon request, we make one of them available to anyone out there who is a legitimate requester for this type of information and/or training.

Miss COLLINS. Well, that's really good to know. I'm still concerned, though, about the common carriers, in view of the fact that in upstate New York most of them were by common carrier. Do you have any suggestions on what we can do to bring them into the fold, so to speak, where they're cooperating with the Federal—

Mr. BROWN. Well, I think they are cooperating, and ATF routinely responds to training requests from UPS and other common car-

riers such as that, and we conduct that training at no cost to them at their site; but I understand where you're coming from. Perhaps there needs to be some more significant effort toward addressing and getting to the common carriers and providing more training to them. I understand what you're saying.

Miss COLLINS. Yes. What I'm thinking is that perhaps we should mandate that they have some kind of prevention program, either through the Federal agencies or private, but that they have some kind of a program. Do you understand what I mean—for their employees, because today it's not just U.S. Postal. There's just so many types of delivery systems, and I would think that, if we are about the business of protecting the public that, even though you're a private carrier, you still have a responsibility to train your employees and to protect the public.

Let's see. You stated that explosives devices like dynamite are easily available and practically sold over the counter. Are the purchasers required to provide any type of identification? Are there any background checks made on the buyers?

Mr. BROWN. There are no background checks. It's very similar to purchasing a firearm. You do have to provide identification. In the case of the bombings in upstate New York, you may be aware that that dynamite and the detonators were purchased in Kentucky, but the individuals used fictitious identification, fictitious driver's license.

So you do have to identify yourself when you purchase explosives, very similar to a firearm, but it's still very easy to obtain and use fictitious identification to purchase the explosives. Rarely are explosives purchased, then used in a device like this, but it does happen from time to time.

Miss COLLINS. But you were able to apprehend them—what?—the next day.

Mr. BROWN. That's correct.

Miss COLLINS. In spite of that. Well, I thank you very much. I think that this has been a very informative hearing. Again, I regret the fact that I did not include the common carriers. So perhaps I can do that at a later date. I know they're not law enforcement agencies, but I think that they should participate, nevertheless.

I'm pleased to know that there is the coordination between the three agencies, and I think the Postal employees will be pleased to know that also. I'm glad to know of the training that you're giving.

Mr. Hearst, I think you mentioned that all postal inspectors and about 20 percent of the general employee population is trained. I'd like to see that increased or at least the offer made, because that prior training seems to really be preventive, and that's better than apprehending the criminals afterwards but, you know, preventing some.

Mr. HEARST. Absolutely.

Miss COLLINS. I thank you very much. Unless you have any further statements to make, that will conclude this hearing.

Mr. HEARST. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Miss COLLINS. Thank you. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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